Exploit-Forge @ExploitforgeLTD

@cyber_razz "That is not a password reset flow. That is an account takeover endpoint." Said everything. This is why we review code the way an attacker reads it, not the way a developer wrote it.

@cyber_rekk Attack paths are rarely created by attackers. They're created internally over months or years and simply discovered by attackers first. That should be in every security briefing to a board. The attacker didn't build the path. Your environment did. They just found it.

How many vulnerabilities can you spot in this code?

Exposed internal endpoints assumed to be unreachable…a scanner finds them in eleven minutes. Authentication that breaks the moment a request looks slightly different from what the developer expected. Third-party integrations where nobody has ever reviewed what each one can actually reach. Valid credentials from someone who left. Account disabled. Service account they used was not. None of these require a sophisticated attacker. Just someone actually trying. #infosec

A pattern across engagements we've run over the last twelve months…four findings that show up in almost every engagement we run. #cyberawareness #cybersecurity

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@cyber_razz This is exactly it. The most dangerous word in any security review isn't "vulnerable", it's "assumed." Assumed disabled. Assumed monitored. Assumed covered. Assumed harmless. Attackers don't need sophistication. They just need one assumption nobody thought to verify.

@T3chFalcon We appreciate this mention. The standard we hold ourselves to is exactly what you've described…engagements where someone actually did the work, thought about the environment, and wrote something that means something to the people reading it. Thank you for noticing.

@gabbytech01 That's something we can definitely explore…watch this space.👀

Over the last few years, we've noticed something. Breaches rarely begin with a sophisticated exploit. They begin with an assumption. #cybersecurity #infosec

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@gabbytech01 Getting there…👀🔥

How many vulnerabilities can you spot in this code?

@gabbytech01 Correct on both🎯…There's more in there though, want to keep looking?

Vulnerabilities don't expire. They sit quietly, compounding risk, until someone finds them and that someone is either you or an attacker. The difference is who you invite in first. ExploitForge comes in without the emotions, without the history, and without any reason to look the other way. Just an honest, adversarial assessment of what's actually there.

The client had done pen testing before. Clean history. Sensible scope for what they knew about. That's the problem. Scope is always defined by what you know. The most dangerous risks are usually the ones that weren't on anyone's list. A threat model changes the question from "what's wrong with what we have?" to "what are we missing?" Those are different questions. They produce different findings. DM "THREATMODEL" to run one before your next engagement. #pentest #threatmodel

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The breach didn't happen. That's the point. Most security stories are about what went wrong. This one is about what a threat model caught before it became a story at all. #threatmodel #cybersecurity

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A penetration test operates against what exists. It is bounded by scope, driven by technical validation, and produces findings tied to specific systems and vulnerabilities. Done well, it tells you exactly where your defenses can be broken. A threat model operates before and above that. It maps who your adversaries are, what they want, and what attack paths exist against your environment…. including paths that don't involve any of the systems you've decided to test. It is the exercise that defines whether your pentest scope actually covers what matters.  We've seen well-executed pen tests come back clean while the real risk sat in an integration nobody thought to include in scope. The pentest wasn't wrong. The scope was. That's a threat modelling problem.   Save this for later. #security

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Penetration testing and threat modelling are not the same thing. A pen test validates what exists. A threat model defines whether you're testing the right things in the first place. #pentest #cybersecurity

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This isn't paranoia. It's an accurate reflection of how modern attacks work. Credentials get phished. Devices get compromised. Insiders pose risks. The idea that being "inside" the network equals being safe has been disproven too many times. Zero Trust shifts the question from "is this coming from inside?" to "should this be trusted at all?" At Exploit Forge, our assessments test whether your environment is built to answer that second question correctly.

“We're on the internal network" used to mean something. It doesn't anymore. Zero Trust is built on a simple principle: trust nothing by default. Not the user. Not the device. Not the network segment. Every access request is verified regardless of where it originates. #zerotrust #cybersecurity

Hello @konvashon, we keep pricing off the website intentionally…every engagement is scoped to the specific environment, objectives, and threat profile of the organisation. A fixed price list would mean a fixed scope, and that's not how meaningful security testing works. Send us a DM and we'll have a proper conversation about what the right engagement looks like for you.